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FIFTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS AT SENTENCING
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986).
I. INTRODUCTION
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,I the Supreme Court held that Penn-
sylvania was not constitutionally required to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt a fact 2 that would affect the length of the sentences the
defendants would receive upon conviction. In deciding this ques-
tion, the Supreme Court upheld Pennsylvania's Mandatory Mini-
mum Sentencing Act.3 That Act4 provides that a person convicted
of certain enumerated felonies is subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence of five years imprisonment if the sentencing judge, when
considering the evidence, finds, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the
commission of the felony. The Pennsylvania court convicted each of
the defendants in McMillan of various felonies covered by the Act.5
This Note examines judicial and academic constructions of the
due process clause of the fifth amendment in order to highlight the
due process issues presented in McMillan. This Note then examines
recent due process cases, finding that McMillan is part of a broader
effort on the part of the Supreme Court6 to limit the scope of its
decisions in In re Winship7 and Mullaney v. Wilbur 8 and, consequently,
the applicability of the due process clause to the criminal law.
II. BACKGROUND
The fifth and fourteenth amendments state that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 9
1 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986).
2 The fact to be proved in this case was visible possession of a firearm. McMillan,
106 S. Ct. at 2416.
3 Id. at 2414-20.
4 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).
5 McMi~lan, 106 S. Ct. at 2414-15.
6 See infra notes 126-53 and accompanying text.
7 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
8 421 U.S. 684 (1975); see infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
9 The fifth amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
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Thus, proceedings which threaten any of these interests must com-
ply with certain procedures embodied in the term due process of
law. This potentially straightforward analysis has been complicated
in a number of ways.
The process that is due under the fifth amendment due process
clause differs with the type of proceeding involved.10 Certain re-
quirements imposed on criminal trials by the Constitution may not
extend to other kinds of proceedings. Furthermore, the require-
ments of due process vary not only with the kind of proceeding but
also with the particular situation.II Accordingly, although "in many
respects [a state's capital sentencing hearing] resembles a trial on
the issue of guilt or innocence," [it] need not comply with the sixth
and fourteenth amendments regarding jury requirements.' 2 Simi-
larly, the juvenile justice system must follow some, but not all, of the
procedures prescribed by the due process clause.' 3 Finally, the es-
on a presentment or indictment of a GrandJury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Section one of the fourteenth amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
10 See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
11 "'[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particu-
lar situation demands.'" Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 200 (1982)(quoting Mor-
risey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
12 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1984).
13 The Supreme Court has made it clear that there is a constitutional distinction be-
tween a criminal trial and a juvenile proceeding:
We do not mean ... to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of
the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but
we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and
fair treatment.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967)(quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562
(1966)). The Supreme Court has held that juveniles may avail themselves of a number
of constitutional protections. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975)(holding that
double jeopardy protections apply to criminal proceedings subsequent to adjudicatory
hearings in juvenile courts); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that standard of
proof in delinquency hearings must meet the reasonable doubt standard which is a re-
quirement of due process); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967)(holding that delinquency hear-
ings must guarantee such due process rights as timely notice, right to counsel, right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, and protection against self-incrimination); Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)(holding that decision to transfer ajuvenile to adult
court is a critical phase of processing at which right to due process attaches). However,
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sentials of due process in the context of an agency rulemaking pro-
ceeding differ from those required in an adjudicatory context.' 4
There is also some indication that the three protected interests
(life, liberty and property) are not necessarily coequal. The Court
has characterized a citizen's liberty interest as "an interest of tran-
scending value."' 15 This statement indicates that the due process
clause demands a great deal of procedural protection when a de-
fendant's liberty interest is at stake.' 6
In addition to the above distinctions, which are constitutionally
significant, the Supreme Court has considered a number of other
approaches in determining what process is due. The positivist posi-
tion' 7 on procedural due process continues to receive the support of
some academics' s and members of the judiciary.' 9 The positivists
in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court held that the due process
rights of juveniles charged with unlawful conduct do not include the right to trial by
jury. A number of recent decisions make it clear that the Court is withdrawing or declin-
ing to extend constitutional guarantees to those subject to the juvenile justice system.
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985)(holding that school officials need not
seek a warrant and need not have probable cause to believe that any rule or law has been
violated in order to search students); Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984)(upholding
a provision of the New York Family Act that provides for the pre-trial detention of
juveniles if it were the opinion of the juvenile court that such juveniles would present a
risk to themselves or others were they not detained); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979)(upholding a Georgia statute which provides for the commitment ofjuveniles to
state mental hospitals without the requirement of any adversary hearing); Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)(holding that fifth amendment protections against self-
incrimination did not apply to a juvenile taken into police custody).
14 See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908)("Many requirements essential
in strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with [in the administrative forum].").
15 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
16 In at least two dissenting opinions, Justice Stevens has stated his belief that quali-
tative differences exist between the three protected interests. See Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("a deprivation of
liberty is qualitatively different from a deprivation of property"); Lassiter v. Department
of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59-60 (1981)(Stevens, J., dissenting)(arguing that the
Court should not apply the Mathews v. Eldridge cost-benefit analysis when a person's lib-
erty interest is at stake).
17 For a discussion of the positivist position in the due process context as compared
with the legal philosophy of positivism, see Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1071 n.141 (1984).
18 Professor Easterbrook analyzes the historic antecedents of the due process clause,
the structure of the Constitution, and early due process cases and concludes that the
legislature's determination concerning what procedures are to be followed constitutes
due process of law. As a result, there is nothing for the judiciary to review. See Easter-
brook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85. See also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BYJUDICIARY 193-214 (1977). For an extensive critique of Easterbrook and the work of
the positivists, see Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Due Process,
95 YALE LJ. 455 (1986).
19 Based on his review of historical sources,Justice Black believed that due process of
law means law of the land. Therefore, any legislative enactment which does not offend
other sections of the Constitution meets the requirements of due process because it
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believe that due process of law mandates no more than compliance
with whatever procedures the legislature has mandated shall be fol-
lowed.20 Therefore, no basis exists for judicial review.2' The Court
in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.22 considered and
rejected this reading of the due process clause. The Supreme Court
also rejected the positivists' reading of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment in Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan 23.
In Murray's Lessee, the Supreme Court used an historical test for
determining the procedures required by due process. 24 Thus, the
Court looked "to those settled usages and modes of proceeding ex-
isting in the common and statue [sic] law of England" 25 in order to
ascertain what process was due in that case.
The Court's due process approach has also contained the no-
tion that the due process clause requires all procedures necessary to
secure a fair and just result. A number of cases26 have held that the
proceeding in question must comply with the due process require-
ment of fundamental fairness.
Most recently, the Supreme Court has employed a balancing
test which weighs private and governmental interests in order to de-
termine the process due in each case. The Court first used this ap-
represents part of the law of the land. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 377-86 (Black, J.,
dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist currently is the strongest supporter of this position
on the Court. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1503
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(the court "ought to recognize the totality of the State's
definition of the property right"); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)(Rehnquist,J.,
writing for three Justice plurality)("[P]roperty interest which appellee had in his employ-
ment was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which had accompanied the
grant of that interest.").
20 See Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 94-109.
21 See supra note 19; Redish & Marshall, supra note 18, at 457 n.12.
22 59 U.S. 272 (1855).
It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which
might be devised. The [due process clause] is a restraint on the legislative as well as
on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so con-
strued as to leave congress free to make any process "due process of law", by its
mere will.
Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 276.
23 92 U.S. 480 (1875)(The court implicitly acknowledged that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment imposes normative limits on state procedure); see also Da-
vidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877)(same).
24 Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 277.
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (1970) (due process embodies the notion of
"fundamental procedural fairness"); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116
(1934) ("due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be fair"); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908)(in deciding whether states could compel self-incrimina-
tion in criminal cases, the Supreme Court questioned whether the freedom from self-
incrimination was a "fundamental principle of liberty and justice").
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proach in 1976 in Mathews v. Eldridge.2 7 The test 28 is based on
considerations of economic efficiency and does not even mention
the idea of fairness.
As recent cases illustrate, tests favored by the Supreme Court in
the past have not been conclusively discarded nor are any of the
approaches described above mutually exclusive.2 9 Although the
positivist construction of due process was rejected by the Court long
ago, 30 Justice Black3 1 recently advocated this interpretative ap-
proach, and Justice Rehnquist 32 presently holds this view. More-
over, the Supreme Court has combined the historical and
fundamental fairness tests in its due process analysis. Stating that
due process contains the notion of "fundamental procedural fair-
ness," 33 the Court has drawn its ideas of fairness in part from the
"historically grounded rights of our system" embodied in "the com-
27 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
28
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Redish and Marshall state their belief that the test was a re-
sponse to "the burgeoning administrative state of the late 1960s" which "demonstrated
that the implementation of [all of the procedures mandated by due process in the adju-
dicatory context] across the board was not possible." Redish & Marshall, supra note 18,
at 471 (footnote omitted). The test has been criticized for leaving dignitary values out of
the balance. See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process CalculusforAdministrativeAdjudica-
tion in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHi. L. REV.
28, 51-52 (1976).
In reality the Mathews test and the positivist approach are often functionally
equivalent. Presumably, in enacting the legislation under review the legislature has al-
ready undertaken a cost-benefit analysis similar, if not identical to, the approach de-
scribed in Mathews. Furthermore, it has done so while having within its possession
superior amounts of information and data concerning the likely effects upon individuals,
society, and the judicial system as a whole of various procedural schemes. Therefore, in
the absence of an obvious miscalculation or blatant disregard of relevant data, the Court
is likely to respect the legislature's decision.
29 See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. Redish & Marshall's exposition of
the various due process tests is inaccurate to the extent that their article implies that past
tests have been conclusively discarded or that the Court currently regards these various
approaches as mutually exclusive.
30 See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855);
Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480 (1875); see also supra notes 22 & 23 and
accompanying text.
31 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377-86 (1970)(Black, J., dissenting).
32 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1503 (1985)(Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
33 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 372.
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mon-law tradition."3 4
Delivered in the midst of a complex and ever-changing due pro-
cess analysis, McMillan v. Pennsylvania3 5 represents the Supreme
Court's response to three recent due process cases (In re Winship,36
Mullaney v. Wilbur3 7 and Patterson v. New York38) that have shaped
due process analysis in recent years. In In re Winship, the Supreme
Court decided that the due process clause required proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in an adjudication to determine juvenile delin-
quency.39 The Court's broad statement that due process required
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to consti-
tute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged" 40 was inter-
preted in the latter two cases. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme
Court determined that the reasonable doubt standard applied to all
factors that, if present, could affect the defendant's interests in lib-
erty and reputation.4 1 Nonetheless, the Court subsequently decided
in Patterson v. New York that the rule of In re Winship applied only to
those factors defined by statute as elements of a crime. 42
III. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF McMillan
Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act provides
that a person convicted of certain enumerated felonies is subject to
a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment if the
sentencing judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of
the felony.43 In McMillan the Pennsylvania court convicted the de-
34 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
35 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986).
36 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
37 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
38 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
39 397 U.S. at 367.
40 Id. at 364.
41 421 U.S. at 696-701.
42 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210.
43 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982). Section 9712 provides in relevant part:
(a) Mandatory sentence-Any person who is convicted in any court of this Com-
monwealth of murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter, rape, involun-
tary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery... aggravated assault.. . kidnapping, or
who is convicted of attempt to commit any of these crimes, shall, if the person visi-
bly possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense, be sentenced to a
minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement notwithstanding any
other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary.
(b) Proof at sentencing-Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the
crime.... The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The
court shall consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford the Common-
wealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any necessary additional evi-
dence and shall determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this section is
applicable.
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fendants of various felonies covered by the Act.44 Following the de-
fendants' conviction, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania gave
notice that it would seek to proceed under the Act45 at sentencing.
In each case, however, the sentencing judges found the Act uncon-
stitutional and imposed lesser sentences than those required by the
statute.46 All four cases were appealed to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, which consolidated the Commonwealth's appeals. 47
The appellees advanced two principal arguments. First, they con-
tended that visible possession of a firearm was "an element of the
crimes for which they were being sentenced and thus must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt under In re Winship... and Mul-
laney v. Wilbur."48 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that
the legislature had expressly stated that visible possession "shall not
be an element of the crime" 49 and that according to Patterson v. New
York 50 the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard was a func-
tion of how the state defined the offense.
Appellees also asserted that even if visible possession is not an
element of the offense, due process still requires more than proof by
a preponderance of the evidence. 51 Rejecting the appellant's con-
tention, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the Act did not
create a series of upgraded felonies of which visible possession was
an element because the Act became operative only after conviction
and served merely to limit the sentencing judge's discretion. 52 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the Act was consistent with
In re Winship, Mullaney and Patterson in that it did not create a pre-
sumption with respect to any fact constituting an element of the
crimes in question.53 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found
that the state had a compelling interest in deterring the illegal use of
firearms and that the defendants' liberty interest had been substan-
tially diminished by the guilty verdicts. 54 Therefore, the court held
(c) Authority of court in sentencing-There shall be no authority in any court to
impose on an offender to which this section is applicable any lesser sentence than
provided for in subsection (a) or to place such offender on probation or to suspend
sentence.
44 McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2414-15.




49 Id. (quoting 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 9712(b)).
50 Id.
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that the preponderance standard satisfied due process. 55 The court
then vacated appellees' sentences and remanded for sentencing pur-
suant to the Act.56 The United States Supreme Court granted a writ
of certiorari and affirmed the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. 57
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. THE PLURALITY OPINION
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality of the Court, affirmed
and expanded the reasoning set forth by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The Court stated that its holding was "controlled by
Patterson... rather than Mullaney"58 and found Pennsylvania's statute
to be constitutional since visible possession of a firearm was not an
element of the crimes for which the petitioners were convicted.5 9
The Court deferred to the states' preeminent interest in defining
and controlling crime.60 The plurality relied on Patterson61 for the
proposition that there were constitutional limits beyond which the
states could not go in this regard.62 Although the plurality con-
cluded that Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act did
not exceed those limits, the Court declined to specifically define
them.65 Rather, the majority advanced as an example of unconstitu-
tionality the Patterson Court's rather "unremarkable proposition that
the due process clause precludes states from discarding the pre-
sumption of innocence."' ' The Court observed that Pennsylvania's
statute did not create this type of presumption, nor did it in any way
"relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving guilt."' 65
The plurality distinguished its holding from Mullaney66 and
Specht v. Patterson67 on the basis of the difference between the Penn-
sylvania statute and the statutes at issue in those cases. The defend-
ant in Mullaney, depending on the presence or absence of the




58 Id at 2416.
59 Id at 2416-17.
60 See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).





66 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
67 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sen-
tence.' "68 The defendants in McMillan, the Court observed, were
subjected to the same maximum length of incarceration regardless
of sentencing pursuant to the Act.69 According to the majority,
Specht was similarly distinguishable. The Colorado statute in that
case was held to violate due process because it provided that a per-
son convicted of a sexual offense, carrying a maximum penalty of
ten years imprisonment, could be exposed to an indefinite or life
sentence if a sentencing judge found that the defendant posed a
threat to society. 70 The majority also dismissed the petitioners' as-
sertion "that had Winship already been decided at the time of Specht,
the Court would have also required that the burden of proof as to
the post-trial findings be beyond a reasonable doubt." 7'
In response to the petitioners' concern that states might
restructure their criminal codes to evade the rule of In re Winship,
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for all elements of a
crime, the Court remarked that "[t]he Pennsylvania legislature did
not change the definition of any existing offense." 72 The Court also
observed that the fact that a number of the state legislatures have
made possession of a weapon an element of certain criminal of-
fenses does not render Pennsylvania's approach to weapons posses-
sion unconstitutional. 73
The Court held that Pennsylvania could "treat 'visible posses-
sion of a firearm' as a sentencing consideration rather than an ele-
ment of a particular offense." The Court concluded that the use of
the preponderance standard at sentencing satisfied due process
since "[s]entencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and
found facts without any prescribed burden of proof at all." 74
B. DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dis-
sented on the ground that the Court, and not the states, must decide
"[w]hether a particular fact is an element of a criminal offense." 75
Furthermore, according to In re Winship, these elements "must be
proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt." 76 Citing
68 McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2417.
69 McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2417-18 (quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 700).
70 See McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2418 (citing Specht, 386 U.S. at 607).
71 McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2418.
72 Id. at 2418-19.
73 Id. at 2419.
74 Id. at 2420.
7-5 Id. at 2421 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76 Id.
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Mullaney,7 7 Justice Marshall stated that to hold otherwise would give
a state the opportunity to redefine which facts are elements of a
crime by allowing the state to "undermine many of the interests [In
re Winship] sought to protect. 78 Justice Marshall concluded his dis-
sent by agreeing with Justice Stevens, who dissented separately, that
"'if a state provides that a specific component of a prohibited trans-
action shall give rise both to a special stigma and to a special punish-
ment, that component must be treated as a "fact necessary to
constitute the crime" within the meaning of ... In re Winship.' "79
In his separate dissent, Justice Stevens analyzed Patterson and In
re Winship and reviewed the purposes behind the reasonable doubt
standard, showing that the majority incorrectly relied on Penn-
sylvania's definition of the elements of prohibited conduct. Begin-
ning with a brief recitation of the facts, he noted that the trial
judges, as well as the superior court judges, who heard the appeals
"all concluded that visible possession of a firearm was an element of
the offense[s]" for which the defendants were being punished and
thus, required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.80 Justice Stevens
noted that while agreeing "that visible possession of a firearm is
conduct that the Pennsylvania General Assembly intended to pro-
hibit," 8' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nevertheless held that
this factor was not an element of the offenses. The court's holding
was grounded in its conclusion that the Pennsylvania General As-
sembly stated in the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act that pro-
visions of that Act "shall not be an element of the crime."8 2
Justice Stevens stated that the plurality, in affirming the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, improperly relied upon Patterson v. New
York to hold that Pennsylvania's definition of the offenses in ques-
tion were dispositive for purposes of due process. He noted that
"nothing in Patterson or any of its predecessors authorizes a State to
decide for itself which of the ingredients of the prohibited transac-
tion are 'elements' that it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial."83 On the contrary, Justice Stevens stated that Patterson merely
permits a state, "subject ... to constitutional limits, to attach crimi-
nal penalties to a wide variety of objectionable transactions."8 4
Drawing upon the Court's discussion of the interests protected
77 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
78 McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2421 (MarshallJ., dissenting).
79 Id. (quoting McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2426 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
80 Id. at 2422 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81 Id.
82 Id. (quoting PA. CONS. STAT. 9712 (b)).




by the reasonable doubt standard in In re Winship, Justice Stevens
concluded that the applicability of the due process clause depends
upon whether individuals engaged in a course of conduct are sub-
ject to "criminal penalties" which give "rise to both a special stigma
and a special punishment. ' 85 Furthermore, "[a]s [the Court] held
in Mullaney, '[t]he safeguards of due process are not rendered un-
available simply because a determination may already have been
reached that would stigmatize the defendant and that might lead to
a significant impairment of personal liberty.' "86 Since, under the
statute, visible possession of a firearm subjects a defendant to a
longer sentence than the trial judge would otherwise have imposed,
thereby leading to increased stigmatization and punishment, proof
of that factor should be required beyond a reasonable doubt.87
Justice Stevens concluded his dissent with a discussion of aggra-
vating and mitigating facts and the methods by which a state may
criminalize certain types of conduct.88 Justice Stevens hypothesized
a number of statutes which would criminalize seemingly innocent
forms of conduct and allow a number of affirmative defenses. 89 The
due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would
not apply to proof of the affirmative defenses, because the interests
protected by the due process clause are safeguarded by "the contin-
ued functioning of the democratic process." 90 Such legislation
would never "command a majority of the electorate." 91
Justice Stevens stated, however, that "[i]t is not at all inconceiv-
able.., to fear that a State might subject those individuals convicted
of engaging in antisocial conduct to further punishment for aggra-
vating conduct not proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 92 By im-
pinging upon the individual's "interest in avoiding both the loss of
liberty and the stigma that results from a criminal conviction," the
presence of these aggravating factors must be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.93 Accordingly, Justice Stevens found that proof of
visible possession of a firearm under Pennsylvania's Mandatory Min-
imum Sentencing Act must meet the reasonable doubt standard of
due process.
85 Id. at 2422.
86 Id. at 2424 n.3.
87 Id. at 2426.
88 Id. at 2424-26.
89 Id. at 2424-25.
90 Id. at 2424.
91 Id. at 2425.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 2425-26.
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V. ANALYSIS
Although the range and complexity of due process analysis
served to guide the Court in its decisionmaking, the Supreme Court
decided McMillan v. Pennsylvania94 within the analytical framework
provided by a trio95 of recent due process cases. Taken together,
these cases illustrate the Supreme Court's changing attitude toward
fifth amendment criminal law analysis. During the Warren Court,
the Supreme Court extended the application of the due process
clause to various components of the criminal justice system. 96 In re
Winship's97 formal constitutionalization of the standard of proof
used in criminal proceedings represented a continuation of this
trend. The Supreme Court's decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur98 repre-
sents the furthest extension of due process protections within the
criminal context. In Mullaney the Court indicated that a state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crime, includ-
ing all factors which, if proven, would have an effect upon the de-
fendant's interests in liberty and reputation. 99 Fearful of the effects
on the use of presumptions and affirmative defenses, the possibili-
ties for legislative reform and the criminal justice system as a whole,
the Supreme Court upheld a state statute in Patterson v. New York. 00
The statute involved in that case required the defendant to prove
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence in order to reduce second-degree mur-
der to manslaughter. The Patterson Court also presented a
revisionist history of Mullaney in an attempt to limit some of the im-
plications arising from this earlier decision. 10 '
Like Patterson, McMillan represents a continuation of the Court's
movement away from Mullaney and the interpretation of In re Winship
that Mullaney presented. McMillan reflects the Supreme Court's ef-
forts to prevent the application of the due process clause, and con-
sequently the reasonable doubt standard, to all aspects of the
94 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986).
95 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
96 See, e.g., Thomas & Bilchik, ProsecutingJuveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empiri-
cal Analysis, 76 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 453 (1985). For cases illustrating the
application of due process to the juvenile justice system, see Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.
519 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); see also supra note 13.
97 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see also infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
98 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
99 Id. at 697-706; see also infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
100 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
101 Id. at 214-16; see also infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
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criminal law. An analysis of the significance of McMillan requires
close consideration of those three earlier cases.
In In re Winship, the Supreme Court determined the burden of
proof constitutionally required in an adjudication determining juve-
nile delinquency.' 0 2 In deciding In re Winship, the Court relied on In
re Gault,l0 3 a juvenile delinquency case decided three years earlier.
In In re Gault, the Court stated that although the requirements im-
posed by the fourteenth amendment vary depending on the type of
proceeding involved, the due process clause requires that an adjudi-
catory hearing to determine juvenile delinquency must comport
with " 'the essentials of due process and fair treatment.' 104 The
Court, in In re Winship, held that the reasonable doubt standard of
proof was one of the essentials of due process. The Court stated its
holding in broad terms:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of
the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the due process
clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.' 0 5
In one respect, In re Winship was a rather unremarkable decision. In
granting constitutional protection to the reasonable doubt standard,
In re Winship merely confirmed the existing state of affairs regarding
the degree of proof required in criminal cases.' 0 6 At the same time,
however, the language used and the circumstances of the case indi-
cate a more general holding. In re Winship dealt specifically with the
burden of proof required in ajuvenile delinquency hearing. Yet the
Supreme Court presented its decision in the form of a rule that was
not limited to the facts of that case. Furthermore, the Court in Win-
ship applied a rule used within the context of a criminal trial to a
juvenile delinquency proceeding. As a result, such words as "con-
viction," "fact," and "crime" were left open to creative definition.
There are two major interpretations 10 7 of the Supreme Court's
102 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970).
103 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
104 Id. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)).
105 Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
106 The Court described the historical prevalence of the reasonable doubt standard in
criminal trials and cited many of its earlier opinions where it had assumed that this bur-
den of proof was constitutionally mandated with respect to a criminal charge. See Win-
ship, 397 U.S. at 361-64. See also id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("It is only because of
the nearly complete and long-standing acceptance of the reasonable-doubt standard by
the States in criminal trials that the Court has not before today had to hold explicitly that
due process .. .requires [this] standard.").
107 For a discussion and critique of the procedural interpretation and the formalist
interpretation of In re Winship, see Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of
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holding in In re Winship. The procedural interpretation10 8 views In re
Winship as requiring a state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
presence or absence of every factor, including the definitional ele-
ments of the offense, having an impact on penal liability. The for-
malistic interpretation 0 9 of In re Winship requires a state to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt only those elements included in the
state's definition of the offense. 110 The Supreme Court's decisions
in Mullaney I I I and Patterson 112 help to clarify the parameters of the
holding in In re Winship.
In Mullaney, the Supreme Court of the United States held un-
constitutional a Maine homicide statute" 3 that placed upon the de-
fendant the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that he acted "in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation" in
order to secure a manslaughter conviction."14 The Court accepted
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction that under the law
of Maine murder and manslaughter are not distinct crimes, but
rather, different degrees of the single generic offense of felonious
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE LJ. 1325, 1328-38 (1979). In addition to acknowledg-
ing the two above-mentioned theories, Professor Allen also presents the political com-
promise and proportionality interpretations of In re Winship. See Allen, The Restoration of
In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New
York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30, 46-53 (1977). Allen presents these two approaches by way of
a discussion of Patterson v. New York, a case which he sees as "restor[ing] Winship to its
original purpose." Id. at 37. The political compromise theory would permit placing the
burden of persuasion on the defendant when the legislature would have refused to
adopt the defense except for the fact that the burden of proof has been placed on the
defendant. The proportionality theory states that there must be proportionality be-
tween the maximum punishment authorized by statute for the commission of the offense
and the seriousness of the offense. The eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment provides the constitutional basis for the proportionality princi-
ple. See id. at 46-53. This Note declines to classify as 'major' these two interpretations
because of the absence of language in In re Winship, Patterson or Mullaney which would
indicate that the Court had adopted either of these approaches. Professor Allen himself
admits that the Patterson Court neither mentions the eighth amendment nor the propor-
tionality doctrine. See id at 53.
108 See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 107, at 1333-38.
109 SeeJeffries & Stephan, supra note 107, at 1328-33.
110 See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 107.
III See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
112 See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
113 The Maine murder statute, ME. REv. STAT. ANN., Tit. 17, § 2651 (1964), provided:
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or
implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life." The Maine
manslaughter statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Tit. 17, § 2551 (1964), in relevant part pro-
vides: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden prov-
ocation, without express or implied malice aforethought.., shall be punished by a fine
of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years ......
114 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704.
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homicide. 15 Advancing a formalist interpretation of the holding in
In re Winship, the State of Maine asserted that absence of "heat of
passion, on sudden provocation," ' 1 6 is not a fact necessary to con-
stitute the crime of felonious homicide and, therefore, need not be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance with the holding
in In re Winship. 17 Viewing the issue "in terms of the potential dif-
ferences in the restrictions of personal liberty attendant to each con-
viction," 1 8 the Supreme Court demolished the formalistic view 119
of In re Winship:
[I]f Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as de-
fined by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that
decision sought to protect without effecting any substantive change in
its law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements that con-
stitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely
on the extent of punishment. 120
Looking at "substance" over "form" with respect to Maine's statu-
tory scheme, the Court rested its decision on the fact that the pres-
ence or absence of sudden provocation affected the degree of
criminal culpability' 2 ' and, consequently, the defendant's interests
in liberty and reputation.' 22
Mullaney's requirement that the state prove beyond a reason-
able doubt the presence or absence of all factors affecting penal lia-
bility, promised to revolutionize the criminal justice system. The
Court's procedural approach to due process in Mullaney threatened
to strip American criminal law of its sophistication by prohibiting
the use of all presumptions and affirmative defenses. 123 Rather than
bear the burden of proving the absence of these mitigating circum-
stances, the states would probably return to a set of offenses without
grade or differentiation.' 24 As a result, state criminal codes would
become more severe. 125 Ironically, in attempting to afford the de-
115 Id. at 691-92.
116 ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Tit. 17, § 2551 (1964).
117 421 U.S. at 697.
118 Id. at 698.
119 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
120 421 U.S. at 698.
121 In Maine a finding that the defendant committed murder leads to life imprison-
ment, a manslaughter finding leads to a maximum 20 year sentence and maximum possi-
ble fine of $1,000. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Tit. 17, §§ 2551, 2651 (1964).
122 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 696-701.
123 The academic and judicial response to Mullaney v. Wilbur ranged from a belief that
Mullaney disallowed all affirmative defenses to a belief that that decision may be safely
confined to its facts. SeeJeffries & Stephan, supra note 107 at 1340-41 and accompanying
footnotes.
124 See id. at 1353-56.
125 See id.
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fendant the most procedural protection possible, the Supreme
Court in Mullaney rendered a decision which promised to serve
poorly the interests of future defendants.
In Patterson,126 the Supreme Court moved to limit the scope of
its decision in Mullaney and to stop what it regarded as the overcon-
stitutionalization of the criminal process. 127 The decision also re-
flected the Court's concern with the administrative costs associated
with the requirements of due process. 128 The Patterson Court up-
held a New York statute' 29 requiring a defendant charged with sec-
ond-degree murder to prove extreme emotional disturbance by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to be convicted of man-
slaughter. 130 The Court distinguished Mullaney on the ground that
sudden provocation and malice aforethought were mutually exclu-
sive.13 1 Consequently, Maine's requirement that the defendant
bear the burden of proving the former by a preponderance of the
evidence was the same as requiring the defendant to prove the ab-
sence of the latter. Therefore, according to the Patterson Court, the
statute in Mullaney was declared unconstitutional because its pre-
sumption concerning a mitigating factor was, in effect, a presump-
tion concerning an element of the crime.' 3 2 The Court stated that,
on the contrary, the affirmative defense of extreme emotional dis-
turbance "does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which
the State is to prove in order to convict of murder."' 133
Having presented a revisionist history of its holding in Mullaney,
126 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
127 See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214-15 n.15. Justice Rehnquist's concurrence provides
the only indication that the Court in Mullaney was concerned with the impact of its hold-
ing upon the use of affirmative defenses. Justice Rehnquist stated his belief that the
holding in Mullaney did not overrule the Court's decision in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S.
790 (1952), which sustained a requirement that the defendant bear the burden of prov-
ing insanity. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 705-06.
128 See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
129 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975) provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: 1. With" intent to cause the
death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person;
except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense
that: (a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(2) (McKinney 1975) provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: .... 2. With intent to
cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third
person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under
the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of sub-
division one of section 125.25. ...
130 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201.
131 Id at 213, 215-16.
132 Id. at 215-16.
133 Id at 207.
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which allowed the Court to avoid overruling that case, the Supreme
Court proceeded in Patterson to adopt a formalist approach13 4 to the
due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Court stated that "the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in
the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged."' 1 5
Acknowledging the possibility that states would exploit the decision
by reclassifying as affirmative defenses some elements of the crime
in question, the Court stated that there were "constitutional limits
beyond which the States may not go in this regard."' 3 6
A number of concerns motivated the Court in Patterson. The
Court knew that Mullaney, taken to its logical conclusion, would have
the effect of abolishing all affirmative defenses, including the
twenty-five affirmative defenses contained in New York's criminal
code.' 3 7 Consequently, the Supreme Court stated that the "Due
Process Clause ... does not put New York to the choice of aban-
doning those defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence in
order to convict of a crime .. ."138
The Supreme Court was also concerned with economic effi-
ciency and the administrative costs associated with the requirements
of due process.' 3 9 The Court acknowledged Justice Harlan's state-
ment in In re Winship that the reasonable doubt standard is based on
a fundamental value determination that it is worse to convict an in-
nocent person than let a guilty one go free. 140 However, " [D]ue pro-
cess does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at
whatever cost, to eliminate [this] possibility."'14 1 Without mention-
ing Mathews v. Eldridge 142 by name, the Supreme Court nevertheless
adopted a balancing approach roughly similar to the one presented
in that case. 143
134 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
135 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added).
136 Id.
137 See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207, 211 n.13; see also supra notes 116-18.
138 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207-08.
139 The Supreme Court's concern with economic efficiency was manifested in Ma-
thews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), an administrative law case which the Court de-
cided one year before Patterson. See supra notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text.
140 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208 (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
141 Id. (emphasis added).
142 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
143
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and fi-
nally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
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To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the
State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in
issue, if in its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive,
and too inaccurate. 144
In constructing its criminal code, the state legislature must weigh
the costs associated with the placement of these burdens upon the
state against the magnitude of the individual interests at stake.
The Supreme Court may have omitted mentioning Mathews for
a number of reasons. The Mathews decision concerned an adminis-
trative procedure and, therefore, may be of limited applicability to
the criminal law. The Court also may have been dissuaded from
employing a strictly economic approach in determining what pro-
cess is due in criminal cases because of the transcendent value
placed upon life and liberty. A cost/benefit analysis would serve
only to denigrate those interests.
Following the formalist approach laid down in Patterson,'45 the
Supreme Court in McMillan declined to hold that due process re-
quired the use of the reasonable doubt standard of proof with re-
gard to the issue of visible possession of a firearm. 146 The Court
rested its decision on the fact that "the Pennsylvania legislature has
expressly provided that visible possession of a firearm is not an ele-
ment of the crimes enumerated in the mandatory sentencing
statute."
14 7
Although it dismissed Mullaney in favor of its "most recent pro-
nouncement on this subject"14 8 - Patterson v. New York - the major-
ity nonetheless applied the interests analysis of Mullaney in its
opinion. Depending on the presence or absence of the factor at is-
sue in Mullaney, the defendant in that case faced "'a differential in
sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sen-
tence,'"149 whereas, the defendants in McMillan, the Court ex-
plained, were subjected to the same maximum lengths of
incarceration with or without being sentenced pursuant to the
Act.' 50 Thus, without actually using the language of Mullaney, the
Court implied that the Act was acceptable under due process be-
cause it does not compel the defendants to forfeit their liberty inter-
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Id. at 335.
144 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 209 (footnote omitted).
145 See McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2416-17.
146 Id. at 2419.
147 Id. at 2416.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 2417 (quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 700).
150 Id. at 2417-18.
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est to any greater degree than that which had already occurred upon
conviction.
The Court had applied this approach to the facts within its ear-
lier decision in Specht v. Patterson.'5' According to the majority,
Specht was similarly distinguishable because the Colorado statute
which was held to violate due process in that case stated that a per-
son convicted of a sexual offense, otherwise carrying a maximum
penalty of ten years imprisonment, would be exposed to an indefi-
nite or a possible life sentence if the sentencing judge found that the
defendant posed a threat to society.1 52 The Court's subtle use of
the interests test of Mullaney helps explain justice Rehnquist's rather
sudden concession to Mullaney contained in his statement that "in
certain limited circumstances Winship's reasonable doubt require-
ment applies to facts not formally identified as elements of the of-
fense charged."15 3 The Court thus left open the possibility of
applying the reasonable doubt standard to factors not included in
the state's definition of the offense. In justifying its conclusion
under both Mullaney and Patterson, the Court made its decision virtu-
ally unassailable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court rendered its decision in McMillan v. Penn-
sylvania against the background of a complex and ever-changing due
process analysis. 154 The requirements of due process vary depend-
ing on the type of proceeding involved.' 55 Furthermore, the three
protected interests, life, liberty and property, are not necessarily
equal.156 Finally, the Supreme Court has employed various meth-
ods to determine what process is due. These methods have ranged
from an application of procedures in existence at the time of the
American Revolution, to those procedures deemed to be "fair," to a
test which balances the relative burdens a given procedurewould
place upon the state or individual. 57
The Court decided McMillan more narrowly within the concep-
tual framework provided by three recent due process cases. The
Court in In re Winship stated that every fact which is an element of
151 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
152 See McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2418; see also Specht, 386 U.S. at 607.
153 McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2417.
154 See notes 9-38 and accompanying text.
155 See notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
156 See notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
157 See notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.158 The Court
later handed down two cases' 59 which presented two different inter-
pretations of the In re Winship decision. Mullaney 160 adopted the
proceduralist view, holding that all factors having an impact on the
defendant's liberty or reputational interests must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. Adopting a formalist approach, the Supreme
Court in Patterson 161 later stated that due process required proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of all elements included in the definition of
an offense. 162
The McMillan Court adopted the concerns of Patterson and en-
forced that decision. Such concerns included the fear that the appli-
cation of the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of all factors having an effect on the defendant's interests in
liberty and reputation would cause the state to remove from its laws
all such mitigating or aggravating factors.' 63 The Court also
showed concern about economic efficiency and the need to weigh
the burdens upon the state to prove a mitigating circumstance. 164
McMillan v. Pennsylvania is thus part of the Burger Court's broad ef-
fort to limit the applicability of the due process requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal context.
ANTHONY J. DENNIS
158 See also note 99 and accompanying text.
159 Muflaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S 197
(1977).
160 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
161 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
162 Id. at 210; see also note 137 and accompanying text.
163 See notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
164 See notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
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